“That’s Not My Fingerprint, Your Honor”
Lawyer Saved By The Spanish
National Police From FBI Terrorist Frame-up
By Hans Sherrer
magazine, Issue 25, Summer 2004, pp. 11-14, 19
is easy to think – “It won’t happen to me” – when one hears of a person
wrongly accused or convicted of a heinous crime. However, the lack of
critical judicial examination of police agency arrest and search warrant
affidavits creates an environment where any one of us at any time can have
our life shattered by being falsely implicated in a capital crime. That is
the cautionary message of Brandon Mayfield’s saga of how he was wrongly
fingered by the FBI as an international terrorist involved in murderous
bombings in a country he has never visited.
FBI Affidavit Tagged Brandon Mayfield As A
Brandon Mayfield was arrested by the FBI on the morning of May 6, 2004 at
his office in a Portland, Oregon suburb. He was arrested for his suspected
involvement in the March 11, 2004 bombing of four commuter trains in Madrid,
Spain that killed 191 people and injured over 2,000 others.
federal judge signed the material witness warrant authorizing Mayfield’s
arrest based on a supporting affidavit by FBI agent Richard K. Werder. The
affidavit’s lynchpin was the allegation that senior FBI fingerprint examiner
Terry Green identified “in excess of 15 points of identification during his
comparison” of Mayfield’s prints on file with the Army and the FBI, and a
“photograph image” of a print recovered from a plastic bag containing
several detonators found in a stolen van near where three of the bombed
affidavit further alleges that the fingerprint identification was
verified by an FBI fingerprint supervisor, and a retired FBI fingerprint
examiner with 30 years of experience on contract with the lab’s Latent
addition the affidavit states:
“… the FBI lab stands by their conclusion of
a 100 percent positive identification.”
5 and, that after an April
21, 2004 meeting between agent Green and the Forensic Science Division of
the Spanish National Police (SNP), “it was believed the SNP felt satisfied
with the FBI laboratory’s identification [of Mayfield]…”
After Mayfield’s arrest, his wife Mona told
reporters, “I think it’s crazy. We haven’t been outside the country for 10
years. They found only a part of one fingerprint. It could be anybody.”
7 Her words in defense of
her husband were soon to prove prophetic.
Werder’s affidavit asserts Mayfield was
initially targeted as a suspect in the bombing when his print was identified
by FBI’s Automated Fingerprint Identification System (AFIS) as one of
several possible matches with one of the prints recovered from the plastic
bag by the SNP. The affidavit further states FBI examiner Green then
manually matched the print of the fourth AFIS match to the Madrid print as
belonging to Mayfield, and then the other two examiners referred to in the
affidavit verified that match.
Yet in spite of the certainty of the
affidavit’s language tying Mayfield to the Spanish bombing, on May 24th the
FBI suddenly reversed itself by acknowledging his print didn’t match one on
the plastic bag, a federal judge dismissed the material witness warrant, and
Mayfield was released from federal custody.
Brandon Mayfield in May 2004 after his
release from being falsely imprisoned as an international terrorist.
Spanish National Police Knew Mayfield Was
reversal wasn’t surprising to the SNP. That agency’s fingerprint analysts
reported to the FBI on April 13th – 23 days before Mr. Mayfield’s arrest –
that their comparison of his fingerprint with the one on the plastic bag was
“conclusively negative.” 9
Corroborating that conclusion was the
Spanish government had no record that Mayfield had ever traveled to that
The FBI discounted the SNP’s assessment to
the degree that when the FBI lab’s Ted Green traveled to Spain in late April
to meet with SNP officials to discuss the bureau’s identification of
Mayfield, he didn’t bother to examine the original print on the bag. 10 However Spanish
officials not only “refused to validate” the FBI’s identification of
Mayfield, but they continued their investigation as if his prints weren’t on
the bag. 11
So the SNP’s disagreement with the FBI’s
Mayfield match was grossly misrepresented by the assertion in agent Werder’s
affidavit, “…the SNP felt satisfied with the FBI laboratory’s identification.”
12 That disagreement became
public knowledge when SNP officials announced on May 20th that they had
linked two prints on the bag to an Algerian with a police record and a
Spanish residency permit. 13
The next day a federal judge in
Portland ordered Mayfield’s conditional release from custody and three days
later the warrant against him was dismissed.
14 Seven days later, on May
31st, a Spanish high court judge issued an international arrest warrant for
the Algerian charging him with 190 counts of murder.
After Mayfield’s exoneration on May 24th, the
FBI claimed the error was caused by its crime lab’s reliance on a
“substandard” image of the Madrid print.
16 However that claim was
contradicted by former Scotland Yard fingerprint examiner Allan Bayle, an
internationally recognized expert with more than a quarter century of
experience who was retained by Mr. Mayfield’s public defenders. Mr. Bayle
determined the clarity of the Madrid fingerprint photo is good, and that
they are so dissimilar from Mayfield’s that they shouldn’t have been
declared a match by a competent examiner.
17 He said of the FBI’s
analysis, “It’s flawed on all levels,” and he described it as “horrendous.”
Federal prosecutors went beyond the FBI’s assertion that the image was
“substandard” by claiming in a document related to his release, “Using the
additional information acquired this weekend in Spain, the FBI lab has now
determined that the latent print previously identified as a fingerprint of
Mayfield to be of no value for identification purposes.”
statement is contradicted by both Mr. Bayle’s
assessment and the SNP’s May 20th announcement of a suspect. So in trying to
cover their tracks, both the FBI and federal prosecutors have issued suspect
statements about the circumstances of why Mayfield was targeted.
Fingerprint Analysis Is A Pseudoscientific
obvious question is: How can fingerprint analysis be so unreliable that
three FBI experts and an independent analyst could mistake the print of a
mild mannered family man with an expired passport who has never been to
Spain, for that of an international terrorist? The answer lies in
understanding the foundation of fingerprint theory rests on three
assumptions - two that are scientifically unproven and one that has been
The first assumption - that fingerprints are
unique – has been accepted on blind faith by courts in the U. S. since 1910.
Fingerprint uniqueness has not been
scientifically proven, and it may be unprovable. It was noted e.g., in a
2001 book co-edited by renowned forensic scientist Henry C. Lee, “From a
statistical viewpoint, the scientific foundation for fingerprint
individuality is incredibly weak.”
The second assumption – that a person’s
fingerprints have unique identifiers that can infallibly be measured - has
likewise not been scientifically proven. Differing methods of identifying a
person by their physical characteristics were developed during the 19th
century. However no scientific basis established the accuracy of any of
them. The British Home Office, e.g., rejected the use of fingerprints for
identification purposes in 1894, because “there was no reason to resort to
an unproven technology like fingerprints.”
eventually enjoyed widespread adoption because they are easy to obtain,
classify, catalog, retrieve and compare. Thus the adoption of fingerprint
patterns as an identification method was driven by bureaucrats who embraced
it as meeting their work requirements – and who had no concern for the
scientifically unsubstantiated idea they can be measured to unfailingly
identify a person. Expediency continues to be a justification for
fingerprinting. Proponents argue that its common use for 100 years justifies
continuing to do so.
The third assumption – that fingerprint
examiners have the skill to infallibly determine if print samples from
different sources originated from the same person – has been empirically
disproven. The many people falsely implicated in a crime by an erroneous
fingerprint ID is consistent with proficiency tests over the past several
decades that have resulted in failure rates by experienced examiners of over
50%. That lack of expertise is predictable considering fingerprint analysis
is an artful technique that depends on a human interpreter’s subjective
evaluation. In 1892 Francis Galton, one of the fathers of fingerprinting,
was honest enough to write, “A complex pattern [like fingerprints] is
capable of suggesting various readings, as the figuring on a wallpaper may
suggest a variety of forms and faces to those who have such fancies.”
23 One hundred and ten
years later Scotland’s Justice Minister echoed Galton’s assessment by
acknowledging fingerprinting “was not an exact science.”
24 That observation was in
response to the August 2002 reversal of David Asbury’s murder conviction
when fingerprint evidence used against him was discredited. The FBI is
disingenuous by claiming fingerprinting is scientific, while acknowledging
its lab’s dependence on subjective fingerprint examination techniques. The
agency claims reliance on “human experience” and intuition rather than a
rigorous process results in a more accurate analysis.
25 Yet the essence of the
scientific process is the predictable independent duplicability of test
In Madrid as in Washington D.C., 2+2=4 and
6x7=42. However until the SNP went public with the disagreement over
Mayfield’s print, the FBI insisted on the scientific impossibility that
Mayfield’s fingerprint could be matched in the U.S. while not matching in
Spain. The Mayfield’s case demonstrates what is to be expected of a
subjective art, the conclusion of fingerprint examiners can and does
markedly differ. Critics of fingerprinting are unaffected by the public’s
erroneous perception that it is a science, and it is with good reason that
for more than a century they have favorably compared it with pseudo-sciences
such as tarot card reading, palmistry and graphology.
Since the three assumptions underlying
fingerprinting are unproven or in error, the practice of comparing a
suspect’s print with a crime scene (latent) print is vulnerable to honest
and deliberate misinterpretation, and outright fakery. While a malevolent
examiner can falsify evidence to implicate an innocent person in a heinous
crime, an erroneous ID can be made by a conscientious examiner doing his job
in the way he is trained. This has been borne out both in theory and
practice by events on three continents during the last century.
A 100 Year Tradition of Fingerprint Fakery
handwriting expert Theodore Kytka discovered a process of transferring an
innocent person’s fingerprint to an incriminating object.
Prior to that, French criminologist
Alphonse Bertillon faked “two different fingerprints which ostensibly showed
sixteen matching points of similarity.”
29 Keep in mind that the FBI
claimed to have matched “in excess of 15 points” of Mayfield’s print to the one
on the plastic bag. In 1920 chirographer Milton Carlson demonstrated a technique
for transferring a person’s fingerprint to an incriminating object if a photo of
the person’s print was available. 30
Mr. Carlson wrote that it was easier to
forge a person’s fingerprint than their handwriting, since “to complete a
perfect forgery of a finger-print in the exact form is as easy to make as any
steel ruler, surveyor’s tape, or a wheel within a wheel.”
31 In 1923, former Secret
Service agent E.O. Brown developed a fingerprint forgery method so foolproof
that he successfully planted a fake print of the Berkeley, California police
chief at the scene of a burglary. 32
In 1924, Finger-Prints Can Be Forged was
published, and co-author Albert Wehde, a photographer and engraver, explained
how a crime scene (latent) print can be faked to implicate an innocent person in
a crime. 33
Fingerprint examiners were so fearful of the danger to the practice posed by
investigators and critics such as Wehde, that at the 1927 national meeting of
the International Association for Identification (IAI), the Ethics Committee
a recommendation, “that every possible effort
should be made to checkmate these activities insofar as they may prejudice the
public against latent fingerprints found at the scene of crime as competent
evidence in a criminal trial…” 34
However such public relations efforts were needed
not only to counteract publicity about the development of fingerprint forgery
techniques, but to illuminate the fact that they were actively being used by
police agencies to frame suspects. Two years prior to the IAI’s 1927 meeting,
the FBI identified the forgery of an alleged crime scene fingerprint by a law
enforcement officer. 35
Two years later, at the IAI’s national meeting in
1929, it was reported that law enforcement fingerprint forgery schemes had been
uncovered in Kansas, New Mexico and Minnesota.
36 During the next 30 years the
FBI exposed in a total of 13 states, an average of one police agency fingerprint
forgery scheme every two years. 37
The most extensive known police agency forgery
scheme was uncovered in 1992 when it was discovered that New York State Crime
Lab personnel were forging fingerprint evidence.
38 The subsequent investigation
found that at least five crime lab employees were involved in the forgery ring
that faked fingerprint evidence in at least 40 cases, including homicide cases,
over eight years. 39
Their forgery techniques included lifting
a print from an inked fingerprint card on file and transferring it to crime
scene evidence, and photocopying an inked print and labeling it as a latent
crime scene print. 40
Two of the forgery ring’s five state police officers convicted of perjury,
evidence tampering and official misconduct, were latent fingerprint examiners
certified by the IAI.
The ring’s members admitted they manufactured
fingerprint evidence because it was so easy to do, and get away with doing.
Investigators wrote in the official report to New York’s governor, “In their
confessions, the troopers themselves acknowledged that they chose to
fabricate fingerprint evidence because they knew it would go unquestioned,
because it was so thoroughly trusted.”
The forgery ring was able to operate
for nearly a decade because there was no effective oversight of evidence
processed by the crime lab or suspicion of a technician’s expert testimony,
by lab supervisors, judges, prosecutors, defense attorneys, or news
reporters. The report to the governor noted, “This indifference, in itself,
strongly suggests that the individuals fabricating evidence on a routine
basis had no fear of discovery and, except with a noted exception,
apparently took few steps to cover their tracks.”
As common as fingerprint forgery is known to
have occurred in the past, the falsification of fingerprint evidence has
been exponentially eased by the computerization of fingerprint images by
police agencies, including the FBI. In a November 2003 article, Wired
magazine explored how easily a digitized image such as a photograph can be
altered to be indistinguishable as a fake, using off the shelf software.
44 It is also known that
the fingerprints in the FBI’s computer database are degraded in quality from
a photograph of the same print, which contributes to the ease of falsifying
a match. 45
Fingerprint Identification Is So Inexact
That Honest Errors Occur
ease with which fingerprint evidence can be deliberately falsified by crime
lab personnel is compounded by what could be honest fingerprint
identification errors. Possibly honest errors are known to have led to the
conviction of a number of innocent people.
46 One of those was John
Stoppelli, who was in New York where he lived, 3,000 miles from the scene of
a crime in Oakland, California where his print was allegedly found.
47 Stoppelli was granted a
pardon by President Truman after he had served two years of a six year
Another man, Roger Caldwell, was convicted of
a double murder in Duluth, Minnesota based on fingerprint testimony linking
him to the crime, when he was almost 1,000 miles away in Golden, Colorado.
49 In reversing his
conviction in 1982 after he had been imprisoned for five years of a life
sentence, the Minnesota Supreme Court stated, “The fingerprint expert’s
testimony was damning – and it was false.”
50 The similarity Brandon
Mayfield’s misidentification shares with those cases is he was far from
where his alleged print was found. He was over 5,000 miles from Madrid at
the time the FBI alleged he was handling the plastic bag.
In light of what has been learned in the
intervening century, R. Austin’s Freeman’s 1907 detective novel – The Red
Thumb Print – has proven to be prophetic. Its plot revolved around the
perfect forgery of a thumb print found in blood at the scene of a crime,
that if taken at face value would have sent an innocent man to prison. It is
now known that Mr. Freeman’s story was a cautionary tale about ascribing too
much value to seemingly incontestable fingerprint evidence.
The FBI Threw Caution To The Wind In Going
Brandon Mayfield’s case the FBI threw caution to the wind. The degree to
which the Bureau went to try to tag him as a participant in the Madrid
bombings is indicated by the contentions in FBI agent Werder’s affidavit. To
establish that Mayfield could have personally handled the bag in Madrid, the
affidavit states, “Since no record of travel or travel documents have been
found in the name of BRANDON BIERI MAYFIELD, it is believed that MAYFIELD
may have traveled under a false or fictitious name, with false or fictitious
To infer Mayfield’s possible
allegiance to militant Islamic groups such as the one suspected of
masterminding the Madrid bombings, the affidavit alleges: that he had
represented a Portland man in a child custody case who was later convicted
of conspiring to help al-Qaida and the Taliban in Afghanistan; that he
regularly attended a Mosque in the Portland area that was his place of
worship; that he advertised his legal practice in a business publication
described as a “Muslim yellow page directory”; and that one phone call in
September 2002 was made from Mayfield’s home telephone to the phone of a man
in Ashland, Oregon who at the time was the U.S. director of a Saudi Arabian
based Islamic Foundation, that among other things “was involved in prison
ministry throughout the United States, attempting to educate prisoners about
the religion of Islam… This included distributing reading material to
Glaring by its omission, is any allegation in
Werder’s affidavit that Mayfield had been observed or was otherwise known by
anyone, whether a government agent or informant, of being involved in any
illegal activity whatsoever, much less the four March 2004 bombings in
Madrid, Spain. Quite to the contrary, the affidavit paints the picture of a
devotedly religious family man, who as a sole practitioner lawyer represents
people in civil cases such as child custody disputes and advertises his
business to reach potential clients, and who may have talked once with a man
involved in providing religious (Muslim) educational materials to prisoners
in this country.
Mayfield Was Targeted Because He is a
Mayfield had been a practicing Christian, or Jew, or some faith other than
Muslim, then actions attributable to his belief in that religion set forth
in an arrest/search warrant affidavit would not only have failed to provide
ancillary support for his arrest, but would have highlighted the incongruity
between his lifestyle and the FBI lab’s “conclusion of a 100 percent
positive identification” his fingerprint matched the incriminatory one on
the plastic bag in Spain. 53
Muslims are suspected of executing the Madrid
bombing, so Brandon Mayfield’s Muslim religious beliefs, practices, and
associations were necessarily included in FBI agent Werder’s affidavit to
provide a tangible basis of support for the FBI’s allegation that he was
involved. That may also explain why of the 20 people initially identified by
the FBI’s computer program (AFIS) as possibly matching the Madrid print,
Mayfield was the only one investigated. 54 The other 19 may
have automatically been excluded as non-Muslims. Consistent with that is
after Mayfield was arrested an FBI agent told him his Muslim friends
wouldn’t be able to help him.
The importance of the affidavit’s emphasis on
Mayfield’s religious affiliation is indicated by his lack of involvement in
any criminal activity. This is supported by the assertion of Oregon’s United
States Attorney Karin Immergut: “He was not on our radar screen in this
district. His name was unknown to us.”
Brandon Mayfield’s arrest as a material
witness depended on a federal judge being convinced by FBI agent
Werder’s affidavit to sign the warrant. To be convincing, the affidavit
relied on the reader’s predisposition to be prejudiced against Muslims.
Hence the government proceeded on the assumption that the judge the
warrant was presented to, in this case U.S. District Court Judge Robert
Jones, would share that prejudice and overlook the affidavit’s
inconsistencies and insubstantiality.
After his release, Mayfield expressed his
opinion that his religious orientation was why the FBI selected him, “I
believe I was singled out and discriminated against, I feel, as a
The FBI, however, couldn’t have done
anything without willingly being backed up by federal prosecutors and
federal Judge Jones.
Federal Judge Robert Jones Failed To
Perform His Constitutional Gatekeeper Responsibility
while it is easy to blame the FBI and the US Attorneys Office in
Portland for proceeding without caution – Judge Jones must shoulder
ultimate responsibility for failing to perform his constitutional
gatekeeper function to shield the rights of an American from
over-zealous government agencies and employees. After all, the affidavit
states, “MAYFIELD’s passport expired on October 20, 2003 and he is not
on record for renewal.”
additionally states, “Checks through the National Tracking System going
back one year do not
show any airline travel or border
crossings by BRANDON MAYFIELD…”
58 The affidavit then
surmised that since there was no record of his international travel, “it
is believed that MAYFIELD may have traveled under a false or fictitious
name, with false or fictitious documents.”
59 However a number of
obvious facts undermine that supposition. The FBI’s intense seven week
investigation of Mayfield from March 21st to May 6th didn’t uncover any
proof of any kind he had traveled out of the country at any time during
the previous several months, or that his whereabouts were unaccounted
for during any several day period of time it would have taken him to
stealthily travel to Spain, participate in the bombing’s execution, and
then return to the U.S. without a single client, associate, friend or
family member noticing his prolonged and unusual absence.
affidavit’s attempt to paint Mayfield as guilty by portraying
unremarkable actions and associations related to his Muslim faith as
sinister, coupled with its attempt to gloss over the lack of any
evidence he had ever traveled to Spain, combined with the concealment
that the SNP’s comparison of his print to the one on the plastic bag was
“conclusively negative,” points directly to the FBI’s deliberate attempt
to frame Brandon Mayfield as involved in the Madrid bombing. The
apparent purpose of FBI agent
Werder’s affidavit wasn’t to set out a
series of facts demonstrating Mayfield’s terrorist involvement, but to
fool the gullible into believing it could be true when there wasn’t any
actual evidence supporting the allegation.
The evidence in the public domain
indicates that Judge Jones didn’t seriously question the affidavit’s
inconsistencies from May 6th when federal prosecutors requested he
authorize Mayfield’s arrest, to May 24th when he ordered Mayfield’s
release from federal custody. So the most charitable description of
Judge Jones’ actions is he allowed himself to be duped into rubber
stamping the government's request to have Mayfield arrested, when a
cursory examination of the affidavit offered to justify Mayfield’s
arrest as a material witness would have revealed significant, if not
fatal flaws undermining the allegation he was an international
terrorist. Although it fell on deaf ears, Mayfield had plainly spoken
the truth at his first court hearing when he told Judge Jones, “That’s
not my fingerprint, your honor”
Mayfield Was Saved By The Spanish
a compliant federal judge giving a free hand to the FBI and federal
prosecutors, it was sheer luck that Brandon Mayfield was saved from
possible prosecution for a capital crime by the Spanish National Police
crime lab’s independent analysis of his print. He was also fortunate
that the SNP refused to cave into the FBI’s intense pressure to back up
their identification of Mayfield. Carlos Corrales, commissioner of the
SNP’s science division, said the FBI “called us constantly. They kept
pressing us.” 61
Mr. Corrales was perplexed by the
FBI’s desire to pin the bombing on Mayfield, saying “It seemed as though
they had something against him, and they wanted to involve us.”
It was also fortuitous for
Mayfield that the SNP’s exclusion of him as a suspect attracted
international media attention that U.S. officials couldn’t conveniently
sweep under the rug.
As Mayfield’s attorney, federal public
defender Steven Wax commented, “But for the unusual circumstance of
another national police agency conducting its own independent
investigation, Mr. Mayfield would still be incarcerated.”
63 Mayfield’s other
attorney, federal defender Chris Schatz, openly wondered how many people
didn’t have a White Knight to save them from a police crime lab’s false
fingerprint ID, “Who knows how many people are sitting in state and
federal prisons that have just never come to light because there is no
independent agency like the Spanish National Police.”
The answer to “how many” people have not
been as lucky as Brandon Mayfield is unknown. However it is known that
many innocent people have been victimized by a fingerprint
misidentification during the past century, and that a number of
inescapable human and scientific reasons underlie such errors. So
prudence and a sense of fair play dictates the fingerprint ID of every
suspect should receive the same intensity of independent scrutiny that
prevented Brandon Mayfield’s possible wrongful conviction as a
The day of his release, Brandon Mayfield
shared what he believed was the meaning of his experience for all
Americans, “You can’t trade your freedom for security. Because if you
do, you’re going to lose both.”
1 Transcripts Detail
Objections, Early Signs of Flaws, Les Zaitz, The Oregonian, May 26,
2 FBI Admits
Fingerprint Error, Clearing Portland Attorney, David Heath and Hal
Bernton (staff), Seattle Times, May 25, 2004.
3 Affidavit of Rickard
K. Werder, May 6, 2004, In Re: Federal Grand Jury 03-01, No. 04-MC-9071
(USDC WD OR), 7.
4 Id. at 7.
5 Id. at 8.
6 Id at 8.
7 US Lawyer Held Over
Madrid Bomb Link, Alec Russell, The Telegraph, London, UK, May 8, 2004.
8 FBI Admits
Fingerprint Error, supra.
9 Spain and U.S. at
Odds on Mistaken Terror Arrest, Sarah Kershaw (staff), New York Times,
National Section, June 5, 2004. (Spain continued to insist Mayfield’s
prints were a negative match, and three weeks before Mayfield’s arrest
expressed “serious doubts” to the FBI that his prints matched those on
the bag, Spanish Investigators Question Fingerprint Analysis, KATU 2
News, Portland, OR, May 8, 2004.)
10 Spain and U.S. at
Odds on Mistaken Terror Arrest, supra.
12 Affidavit of
Rickard K. Werder, supra at 8.
Investigators Question Fingerprint Analysis, supra.
14 FBI Admits
Fingerprint Error, supra.
15 Madrid Bombing
Warrant, New York Times, International Europe section, June 1, 2004.
16 FBI’s Handling of
Fingerprint Case Criticized, David Heath (staff), Seattle Times, June 1,
19 FBI Apologizes to
Mayfield, Noelle Crombie and Les Zaitz (staff), The Oregonian, May 25,
20 Suspect Identities:
A History of Fingerprinting and Criminal Identification, Simon A. Cole,
Harvard University Press, 2001, at 177-180. (Discusses the 1910 Jennings
case in Illinois. It was the first case in this country in which a
conviction dependent on fingerprint testimony tying a defendant to a
crime was upheld, and Mr. Jennings was subsequently hanged.)
21 Advances in
Fingerprint Technology, Second Edition, Ed. By Henry C. Lee and R.E.
Gaensslen, CRC Press, 2001, p. 383. (emphasis added).
22 Suspect Identities,
supra at 81.
23 Finger Prints,
Francis Galton, London, Macmillan and Co., 1892, pp. 65-66.
24 Wallace Defends
Fingerprint Remark, BBC News, September 18, 2002, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/uk_news/scotland/2265693.stm
(last visited June 6, 2004).
25 Spain and U.S. at
Odds on Mistaken Terror Arrest, supra.
26 See e.g.,
Scientific Methods, McGraw-Hill Encyclopedia of Science & Technology,
1997, Vol. 16, p.119-120 (Among the requirements of the scientific
method are: “testable consequences;” “repetition of the test;” and
“reliability and accuracy.”).
27 Suspect Identities,
supra at 202-203 (“pseudo-science”).
28 Id. at 275.
29 Id. at 201.
30 Id. at 275.
31 Id. at 275.
32 Id. at 275.
33 Id. at 188,
34 Id. at 277-278.
35 Id. at 278.
36 Id. at 278.
37 Id. at 278-279.
38 Id. at 274.
39 Id. at 274-280.
40 Id., quote at 280.
41 Id. at 274.
42 Id., quote at 280.
43 Id., quote at
44 These Are
Definitely Not Scully’s Breasts: Inside One Man’s Crusade To Save
Gillian Anderson and the rest of the world from the plague of fake
celebrity porn, by David Kushner, Wired Magazine, November 2003, pp.
45 This degradation
occurs from a combination of the scanning process used to digitize them
and the 12.9 to 1 compression ratio used when they are convert into the
WSQ file format used by the FBI to store fingerprints in its database.
46 See e.g., The
Innocents Database, http://forejustice.org/search_idb.htm, which lists a
number of people whose wrongful conviction was contributed to by an
erroneous fingerprint ID.
47 Never Plead Guilty:
The Story of Jake Ehrlich, John Wesley Noble and Bernard Averbuch,
Farrar, Straus and Cudahy, N.Y., 1955, pp. 295-298.
48 Id. at 295-298.
49 Minnesota v Roger
Sipe Caldwell, Nos. 49437, 51505, Supreme Court of Minnesota, 322 N.W.
2d 574, 1982.MN.268, 54-5 <http://www.versuslaw.com>.
50 Id. 75.
51 Affidavit of
Rickard K. Werder, supra at 23. (See also, Spain Bombing Glance,
Associated Press, Seattle Post-Intelligencer, May 24, 2004.)
52 Id. at 13, 16, 18,
19 and 20. (See also, Spain Bombing Glance, supra).
53 Id. at 8.
53 FBI Case Oregon
Lawyer, Les Zaitz, The Oregonian, May 30, 2004 (The FBI’s AFIS returned
20 possible matches).
54 FBI Case Oregon
55 FBI Case Oregon
56 Madrid Bombings
Case Thrown Out Aaisnt Oregon Attorney, CNN.com, May 25, 2004. http://www.cnn.com/2004/US/West/05/24/spain.bombings.lawyer.ap/
57 Affidavit of
Rickard K. Werder, supra at 21.
58 Id. at 21.
59 Id. at 23.
60 Transcripts Detail
Objections, Early Signs of Flaws, Les Zaitz, The Oregonian, May 26,
61 Spain and U.S. at
Odds on Mistaken Terror Arrest, supra.
63 FBI Apologizes to
64 Brandon Mayfield
Opens Investigations Into His Arrest, Andrew Kramer (staff), KATU 2
News, Portland, OR, May 25, 2004.
65 ‘Sneak and peek’
searches dogged family, Joseph Rose (staff), The Oregonian, May 25,
2004. Mayfield’s comment is reminiscent of an observation credited to
Benjamin Franklin, “They that can give up essential liberty to obtain a
little temporary safety deserve neither liberty nor safety.”